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THE QUESTIONABLE CASE FOR USING 
AUCTIONS TO SELECT LEAD COUNSEL  
LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK∗ 
This Article analyzes the shortcomings of using auctions for selecting 
lead counsel in class action cases. In contrast to what proponents of 
auctions suggest, the outcome of an auction is likely to diverge 
considerably from what an informed principal would have chosen. In 
particular, auctions push the percentage of recovery paid to counsel to the 
lowest level at which law firms would be willing to take the case. Because 
of the need to provide counsel with incentives to invest effort and 
resources, however, the class might well be better served by a higher 
percentage than this minimum level, and auctions might push fees to 
levels that are too low. The analyzed problems are ones that arise also in 
those types of cases for which the use of auctions should be considered 
according to the recent recommendations of a Task Force report.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a judicial trend—beginning with Judge Vaughan 
Walker’s well-known ruling in In re Oracle Securities Litigation1—in 
favor of using auctions to select lead counsel in class action cases.2 The 
subject has for some time attracted much attention and debate,3 and it was 
 ∗ William J. Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School; 
Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research and Center for Economic Policy 
Research. This Article is based on a statement I submitted to the Third Circuit Taskforce on Selection 
of Class Counsel; this statement was in turn based on a declaration submitted at the request of counsel 
for the MicroStrategy Plaintiffs’ Group in the case Costaldo v. Microstrategy Inc. I am grateful to Guy 
Halfteck and Assaf Hamdani for their helpful suggestions and to the John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School for its financial support.  
 1. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990); 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 
1990); 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Judge Walker has used the auction device in several 
subsequent cases, including Wenderhold v. Cylink, 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re California 
Micro Devices, 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994). 
 2. Following In re Oracle Sec. Litig., supra note 2, auctions were used to select lead counsel in 
a number of subsequent cases, including In re Network Assoc. Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 
(N.D. Cal. 1999); Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. 
Fla. 1999); In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re 
Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Lucent Technologies Inc. 
Securities Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 
1998); and In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 3. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “Auction Houses”: Legal Ethics and the Class Action, May 18, 
2000 N.Y. L.J. 223, (Col. 1); John C. Coffee, Jr., The PSLRA and Auctions, May 17, 2001 N.Y. L.J. 
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recently examined by a task force of the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit.4  
This Article is based on an analysis that I submitted to the Third Circuit 
Task Force.5 It suggests that, notwithstanding its appeal at first glance, the 
use of auctions to select counsel in securities class action cases is rather 
problematic. I argue that the outcome of competitive bidding would not 
generally be a good proxy for the outcome that would result if the class 
could act as a single and informed principal to strike a bargain with a 
potential counsel.  
The outcome of competitive bidding might well differ from the one 
that an informed principal would choose for two reasons. First, 
competitive bidding would tend to put less weight on the nonprice, 
qualitative dimensions of the choice of counsel (including the counsel’s fit 
to the case) than would a fully informed and adequate representative 
acting for the class. Second, even assuming hypothetically that participants 
in the competitive bidding were identical in all nonprice aspects, 
competitive bidding might well not serve the interests of the class. 
Because such bidding would give no weight to the need to provide counsel 
with incentives, the level of fees produced by competitive bidding might 
well fall below the optimal level for the class. Both problems indicate that 
competitive bidding might well operate to reduce the expected recovery 
and thus adversely affect the interests of the class.  
In its report, the Third Circuit Task Force expressed substantial 
skepticism toward the use of auctions.6 However, the report identified a 
range of cases in which the use of auctions might be warranted.7 In the 
identified cases, various potential problems of auctions do not arise. 
However, the problems analyzed below are ones that might well arise also 
in the cases for which the report recommended that courts consider the use 
225, (Col. 1); John C. Coffee, Jr., Untangling the “Auction Houses” Aftermath, November 30, 2000 
N.Y. L.J. 224, (Col. 3); Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and other Developments in the Selection of 
Lead Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2001); Andrew K. Niebler, In 
Search of Bargained-for Fees for Class Action Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 BUS. LAW. 763 (1999); Note, Class Auctions: Market 
Models for Attorneys’ Fees in Class Action Litigation, 1134 HARV. L. REV. 1827 (2000); See also 
Mark Hamblett, Debate over Sotheby’s Fee-Auction Plan Persists, November 22, 2000 N.Y.L.J. 224, 
(Col. 3). 
 4. See The Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 TEMP. LAW REV. 
689 (2002). 
 5. See Professor Lucian Bebchuk, statement submitted to the Task Force on Selection of Class 
Counsel (June 2001) (on file with author). See also The Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 4, at 727, 
761 (discussing this statement).  
 6. See The Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 4, at Section VIII.A. 
 7. See id., Section VIII.B. 
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of auctions. Thus, the analysis of this Article supports even greater 
skepticism toward the use of auctions than the one expressed by the Task 
Force report. 
II. THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS 
Those judges that have used competitive bidding have regarded it as a 
proxy for “the one-to-one lawyer-client agreement in conventional 
litigation”8 or as a process that enables approximating the attorney 
selection and fee bargain that the class itself would strike if it were able to 
do so.9 As will be explained below, however, this is not the case. A 
competitive bidding process would be unlikely to provide such a proxy or 
approximation to what the class would do if it could act as a single and 
informed principal or, equivalently, to what an informed and loyal 
representative of the class would choose.  
From the perspective of the class, it would be desirable to select 
counsel and a fee schedule so as to maximize the expected net recovery for 
the class. This expected net recovery is in turn equal to (i) the expected 
recovery in the case, minus (ii) the expected expenditure on legal 
representation. The expenditure on legal representation includes both 
attorney fees and expenses; for simplicity, I will focus below on attorney 
fees. 
The argument for competitive bidding is based on the appeal of 
reducing attorney fees. It would be in the interest of the class, so the 
argument goes, to reduce such fees as much as possible. Competitive 
bidding can push down these fees and, it is argued, such reduction cannot 
but benefit the class. On this view, the fees from competitive bidding 
would cost the class far less than the legal fees that could be expected to 
be sought in an ordinary end-of-case settlement proceeding or fee 
application.  
Reducing attorney fees would, by definition, serve the class in 
hypothetical circumstances in which the expected recovery could be 
regarded as fixed. Suppose that everything that the selected counsel will 
have to do could be completely specified in advance and that any accepted 
bid would accordingly produce exactly the same expected recovery. In 
such an imaginary situation, the class interest could indeed be reduced to 
that of minimizing attorney fees.  
The expected recovery in class action cases, however, should not be 
 8. See In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, supra note 2. 
 
 9. See In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
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regarded as fixed. Rather, it is likely to be influenced by the use of 
competitive bidding. Thus, whether bidding would benefit the class would 
depend not only on the bidding’s effects on attorney fees but also on its 
effects on the expected recovery.  
Competitive bidding might well operate to reduce the expected 
recovery in two ways. First, by focusing on which bid offers the lowest 
fee, competitive bidding would likely give insufficient weight to nonprice, 
qualitative dimensions of the contestants. Second, even assuming that all 
potential bidders are identical in their nonprice, qualitative dimensions, the 
push by competitive bidding toward lower counsel fees could, by reducing 
the chosen counsel’s incentives, potentially harm, rather than benefit, the 
interests of the class. I will now turn to examine each of these two 
problems. 
III. QUALITATIVE DIMENSIONS OF THE CHOICE OF LEAD COUNSEL 
The expected recovery is likely to depend on many nonprice, 
qualitative attributes of the chosen lead counsel. For simplicity, I will refer 
to the set of all these attributes as “quality.” The term “quality,” as defined 
here, is clearly very broad and includes more than is captured by the 
ordinary use of the word “quality.”10 It includes not only how experienced 
and skilled a firm is (in litigation in general and in litigating similar cases 
in particular), but also all other attributes that can influence the expected 
recovery. Thus, for example, quality here includes all the attributes of a 
firm that could affect its bargaining power, such as reputational capital 
(known as “tough” in bargaining) or financial resources (which again can 
strengthen one’s bargaining position). It also includes all the attributes that 
affect the “fit” that a selected counsel would have with the lead plaintiff, 
since such fit might affect the working relationship between counsel and 
lead plaintiff.  
Clearly, an informed principal choosing an attorney for a complex 
litigation would pay close attention to the above multiple dimensions of 
quality. Similarly, an informed lead plaintiff with perfect overlap of 
interest with the class can be expected to give much weight to such 
considerations. 
 10. Cf. Proposed Amendments to FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 23(g)(2)(B), available at 
www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2002/B-OICV.pdf (“In appointing an attorney class counsel, the 
court must consider (i) counsel’s experience in handling class actions and other complex litigation, . . . 
and (iii) the resources counsel will commit to representing the class, and may consider any other 
matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class”). 
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In contrast, a competitive bidding process would focus primarily on a 
price comparison. Even Judge Walker, who put forward the use of 
competitive bidding in In re Oracle Securities Litigation, had to conclude, 
after trying to have a full comparison of the bids in terms of their nonprice 
dimensions, that such a comparison by the judge selecting the winning bid 
is not practical.11 
To be sure, a court can, as courts have done in the past, limit 
participation in the contest to bidders that pass a threshold of qualification. 
But eliminating unqualified candidates still does not give as much weight 
to quality considerations as an informed client or informed lead plaintiff 
would be likely to do. An informed client or lead plaintiff would also give 
weight to differences among those candidates that pass—but to an extent 
that might vary—the threshold of minimal qualification. 
Thus, competitive bidding raises the concern that it would give too 
little weight to qualitative considerations relative to the interest of the 
class. Because of this underweighting, selection by competitive bidding 
might not produce the most fitting lead counsel—and for this reason such 
method of selection might not be preferred by a lead plaintiff that is well 
informed and has the class interest in mind. 
IV. INCENTIVES  
Turning now to the second problem with selection by competitive 
bidding, let us put aside the problem of qualitative attributes by assuming 
below, ipso facto, that all candidates for the lead counsel position (or at 
least all those passing the minimal threshold of qualification) are identical 
in all qualitative dimensions, including their fit to the case and to the lead 
plaintiff. Even under this assumption, selection by competitive bidding 
might well not be in the interests of the class. To be sure, the competitive 
bidding process might lead to a reduction in counsel’s percentage of the 
recovery.12 But this reduction might be counterproductive rather than 
beneficial. It might reduce this percentage below the level that would be 
optimal for the class (in terms of maximizing its expected net recovery). 
It is generally recognized that in the context of complex class action 
litigation, counsel for the class is bound to have substantial discretion 
 11. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., supra note 1, at 542. 
 12. For example, the attorneys’ fee award in the Cendant case was slightly above 8% of the 
aggregate recovery. See, Coffee, The PSLRA and Auctions, supra note 3. This award, though yielding 
not less than $262 million in attorneys’ fees, is a significantly lower percent than the benchmark range 
of 25% to 33%. 
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(even with monitoring by an effective lead plaintiff) and counsel’s 
incentives are therefore important.13 In particular, it is important to provide 
counsel with strong incentives to make those large investments of time and 
effort that could serve the interests of the class as the litigation unfolds. To 
be sure, it can be expected that counsel would make the investment needed 
to satisfy what is required by the requirement of professional ethics and by 
reputational concerns. But it would often be desirable to have counsel 
make investments substantially above the floor established by ethical 
constraints and reputational considerations. And given that counsel is 
likely to be best informed about the cost-benefit calculus for such 
additional investments, a substantial degree of counsel discretion in this 
matter is inevitable. It follows that, to encourage counsel to make 
significant investments above the floor established by ethics and 
reputation, the incentives provided to counsel by the fee schedule can be 
quite important. 
Essentially, the problem of providing incentives to the class counsel is 
a special case of what economists refer to as the “principal-agent 
problem.”14 Whenever one party (the “agent” and, in our context, the 
counsel for the class) must exert effort for the benefit of another party (the 
“principal” and, in our context, the class), it is important to set a fee 
schedule that would provide the agent with the appropriate incentives. It is 
generally the case that no incentive schedule can be expected to eliminate 
completely the “agency problem”—the concern that the interests of the 
agent and the principal will not completely overlap. The question is which 
incentive scheme would be best in reducing “agency costs”—costs from 
the agent’s suboptimal performance. And the optimal incentive scheme 
might often be one that would provide the agent with more than the bare 
minimum necessary for the agent take the position.  
What competitive bidding would do, and wherein lies its alleged 
advantage, is reduce the percentage of recovery that the selected counsel 
would get. Such a bidding process would indeed reduce this percentage to 
the lowest level that a law firm could get and still cover the value of its 
investment. But this low percentage, while reducing the fee that the law 
firm will get, might be below the optimal level for the class because of the 
 13. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: 
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 14. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent 
Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979). 
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weakened incentives that it would provide. And the loss to the class from 
these weakened incentives and the smaller expected recovery associated 
with them, might exceed the savings from lower attorney fees.  
To illustrate this point, let us consider a numerical example. Suppose 
that all qualified law firms are identical. Suppose further that the case of 
the class is such that, with a time investment of $150,000 by counsel (an 
investment which is assumed to be sufficient to satisfy applicable 
professional ethics constraints), the expected recovery will be $1,000,000. 
Suppose further that, with an additional time investment of $250,000 (an 
“all-out” effort), the expected recovery in the case will increase to 
$2,000,000.  
Consider now the outcome of competitive bidding, assuming for 
simplicity that bids are in the form of straight percentages of the recovery. 
The competitive bidding process would push bidders to offer a percentage 
at the lowest level that would still provide them with compensation for the 
time they expect to invest. In our example this level is 15%: contenders 
would know that if they get the case on a 15% contingency, they will 
make a time investment of $150,000, and they will get 15% of the 
expected recovery of $1,000,000 with such an investment.  
Note that, with a winning bid of 15%, the selected counsel will not 
make the additional $250,000 investment involved in an all-out effort. 
Such an investment would increase expected recovery by $1,000,000 and 
(given the 15% contingent fee) would increase the counsel’s expected fees 
by only $150,000—less than the $250,000 additional investment by 
counsel involved in an all-out effort. Thus, with a competitive bidding 
process, the winning bid would be one demanding a 15% contingency, the 
expected recovery would be $1,000,000, and the net expected recovery to 
the class would be 85% of $1,000,000 or $850,000.  
Consider next how the class would fare if the selected counsel were 
given a contingent fee of 25% rather than 15%. In this case, the selected 
law firm would elect to make not only the $150,000 investment but also 
the $250,000 investment needed for an all-out effort. Given that the law 
firm can expect to get 25% of the extra $1,000,000 in expected recovery 
produced by the $250,000 additional investment, the firm would expect to 
be compensated for making the all-out effort. As a result, the expected 
recovery would be $2,000,000, and after the 25% fee, the net expected 
recovery to the class would be $1,500,000. 
Thus, in the case under consideration, compared with a contingent fee 
of 25%, competitive bidding would reduce counsel’s percentage to 15% 
and counsel’s expected fees from $500,000 to $150,000. But this reduction 
would overall not be in the best interests of the class. It would decrease the 
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expected net recovery to the class from $1,500,000 to $850,000 (a 
reduction of about 43%). Compared with setting a fee of 25%, the 
competitive bidding process would make the class worse off because, by 
eliminating the incentive to invest in an all-out effort, it would reduce the 
expected recovery by an amount exceeding the savings from lowering 
counsel fees.  
The above example, of course, is not intended to imply that 25% is the 
optimal percentage in all or most cases. An article by Bruce Hay develops 
a systematic economic analysis of the optimal contingent fee that an 
informed client hiring a contingent fee lawyer would set.15 Hay shows that 
such a client would take into account two competing goals: (i) providing 
counsel with incentives to exert effort, and (ii) reducing any profits to the 
counsel above the compensation needed for the counsel’s investment of 
time (profits that Hay labels the lawyer’s “rent”). Any increase in the 
lawyer’s percentage might, on the one hand, improve the lawyer’s 
incentives but might, on the other hand, increase the lawyer’s profit (rent). 
Trading off these two competing considerations provides the optimal 
contingency fee, which might well depend on the characteristics of the 
case and thus vary from case to case. In a class action situation, the aim of 
the lead plaintiff and the court should be to get as close as possible to the 
optimal fee schedule that an informed principal would set to balance these 
two goals. 
The above analysis and illustrating example, then, point out that the 
optimal fee is one that gives weight to both (i) savings to the class from 
reducing attorney fees, and (ii) benefits to the class from providing strong 
incentives to its counsel. While an informed client or lead plaintiff would 
give weight to both considerations (i) and (ii), competitive bidding would 
focus solely on (i) and thus might result in a fee schedule that is too low 
compared with the schedule optimal for the class. 
Indeed, in one basic model analyzed by Hay, the optimal contingent fee 
is generally above the break-even level that leaves the lawyer with no rent 
and that would be produced by a bidding contest.16 There is thus reason to 
be concerned that the fee level set by competitive bidding would often be 
below what would be optimal for the class. This would be especially likely 
to happen whenever consideration of incentives are sufficiently 
significant, i.e., whenever the expected recovery is sufficiently influenced 
by counsel’s investment of effort and time. 
 15. See Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996). 
 16. Id. at 519-20.  
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V. MORE COMPLEX AUCTIONS 
The analysis above assumed for simplicity that the bidding contest 
would take the form of each firm proposing a straight fee. But the point 
made above—that the effect of competitive bidding on reducing counsel 
fees might have significant costs in terms of incentives—would also apply 
to other, more complex forms of competitive bidding.  
Consider, for example, a format under which bidders are asked to 
submit proposals for a minimum recovery from which they will not take 
any fees. In the antitrust suit against Sotheby’s and Christie’s auction 
houses, the judge asked law firms to state a figure X from which they are 
prepared not to take any fees.17 The winning bidder submitting the highest 
X would receive no fees from any recovery up to this submitted X and 
25% from any amount recovered above X.18 Under such a format, the 
competitive bidding process would push lawyers to raise X—which is 
essentially to reduce to zero their share of any dollar of recovery below X. 
Again, while such bidding could lower the selected counsel’s total fees, it 
might produce adverse incentives whose costs would outweigh the savings 
to the class from these lower fees.  
To see that having a large X might be a rather mixed blessing, consider 
a counsel that was selected on the basis of commitment to taking no fees 
from any recovery up to $100,000,000 and to getting 25% of any amount 
exceeding $100,000,000. To see the potential for perverse incentives, 
suppose that the case does not proceed well and that the expected recovery 
falls below $100,000,000. In such a case, the minimum recovery feature 
might eliminate any financial incentive to exert effort that the counsel 
might otherwise have. 
Relatedly, the minimum recovery feature might provide adverse 
incentives with respect to settlement decisions. In the considered example, 
accepting a settlement offer of, say, $90,000,000 would never be in the 
interest of the lawyer. This would be the case even when such acceptance 
would be in the interest of the class—say, because a trial would be 
expected at the time to produce a 50% chance of $150,000,000 recovery 
and a 50% chance of zero recovery. 
 17. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 73 et seq. (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 18. See Judge Revises Lead Counsel Auction Plan, May 19, 2000 N.Y. L.J. 223, (col. 5). 
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VI. WHY AN INFORMED AND LOYAL LEAD PLAINTIFF MIGHT DISFAVOR 
COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
To see the shortcomings of selection through competitive bidding in 
yet another way, consider situations in other contexts in which a principal 
hires an agent for a complex task that cannot be fully specified in advance. 
Consider, for example, a venture capitalist that controls a high-tech start-
up and seeks a CEO to manage it in its next stage. The CEO is to be 
compensated primarily in options on the company’s stock. Would the 
venture capitalist likely select the CEO by having competitive bidding 
among the qualified candidates and hiring the candidate who is willing to 
take the job for the smallest number of options? Hardly.  
The reason why a venture capitalist in such a situation cannot be 
generally expected to use such competitive bidding lies in the two issues 
of quality and incentives that I have discussed in the preceding sections. 
First, the venture capitalist might wish to give some substantial weight to 
how the qualified candidates (those passing the threshold of qualifications 
based on their CVs) might differ in the many relevant dimensions of 
quality, including their fit to the company and to working with the venture 
capitalist. Second, the venture capitalist might prefer to grant the CEO the 
smallest number of options that would be needed to induce the CEO to 
take the job; the venture capitalist might choose to provide the CEO with 
more options in order to provide more high-powered incentives.19  
Similarly, an informed lead plaintiff who has only the interests of the 
class in mind might prefer not to have the compensation of the lead 
counsel set at the break-even rate that a competitive bidding can be 
expected to produce. While such bidding might push down the selected 
counsel’s percentage of recovery, it might actually push it to a level below 
the one that is optimal for the class.  
Supporters of bidding have suggested that a plaintiff that does not 
support selection through competitive bidding cannot be an adequate lead 
plaintiff. Conversely, on their view, a plaintiff’s support for such bidding 
provides an indication that this plaintiff would be an adequate lead 
plaintiff. But the above analysis indicates that this is not the case. The 
interests of a class could well be ill-served by having selection through 
competitive bidding. Opposing such bidding by a potential lead plaintiff 
 19. Similarly, boards of directors that set the options grants to executives of publicly traded 
companies can be expected to ask not only how much would be needed to keep the executive but also 
what options grants would be beneficial in terms of providing the executive with appropriate 
incentives. 
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thus does not at all indicate that this plaintiff would not be an informed 
and loyal representative of the class.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has suggested that, notwithstanding the appeal that 
auctions for selecting class counsel might have at first sight, this 
mechanism is in fact problematic. In contrast to what has been often 
argued, such auctions cannot be expected to approximate the outcome that 
would result if the class could act in an informed manner to strike a 
bargain with a potential counsel. First, competitive bidding would tend to 
attach too little weight to nonprice, qualitative dimensions of the choice of 
counsel. Secondly, competitive bidding would not give sufficient weight 
to the need to provide the class counsel with appropriate incentives. 
Competitive bidding would push outcomes toward the minimum level of 
fees that would be sufficient to make it worthwhile for counsel to take the 
case. This minimum level of fees, however, might be one that would 
induce little effort and investment by counsel and thereby undermine 
rather than serve the interests of the class.  
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